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TIBET AN ETHNONATIONALISM AND INTERNATIONAL POLITICS

June Teufel Dreyer
University of Miami
~ and ~

International Community
Landlocked and containing the world's highest mountain
range and its surrounding windswept plateau, Tibet has until
recently been one of the most isolated regions on earth. Widely
known for the majestic beauty of its scenery and the mystic
attractions of its lamaist Buddhist religion, the Kingdom of
Shangri-la had actually been visited by very few outsiders. Most
of these were devout pilgrims or, as the nineteenth century wore
on, a small number of intrepid western explorers. Though certainly not xenophobic or hostile to individual foreigners, most
Tibetans had little interest in the world beyond their country's
somewhat ill defined borders, preferring to keep that world and its
influences at a distance.
The internationalization of the status of Tibet may be
considered to have occurred in three phases. The first began in the
late nineteenth century, when an expanding czarist Russian empire
began to draw closer to Britain's Indian empire. British statesmen
came to the conclusion that a buffer state would provide a
convenient shield against this expansion. Tibet, by reason of its
geographic location, and because its population was culturally,
religiously, ethnically, and linguistically distinct from that of
China, which claimed suzerainty over it, was a logical choice.
British diplomats began to negotiate with the Qing, or
Manchu, dynasty that then ruled China. In 1893, as a preliminary
step, they concluded with the Chinese government a trade treaty
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involving Tibet. The Tibetans, however, refused to honor the
treaty, since they had not themselves been a party to it. Britain next
tried direct negotiations with Tibet, but these were also rebuffed
by the government of the God-king, the Dalai Lama, on the
grounds that the imperial government in Beijing would not allow
it.
Diplomatic methods having failed, Britain dispatched a
military expedition under Colonel Francis Younghusband. The
Tibetan army had purposely been kept weak to avoid tipping the
domestic balance of power against the influential monastic sector, and despite the country's rugged terrain and harsh climate,
Younghusband 's force took Tibet's capital, Lhasa, without undue
difficulty.
Qing officials, in what later proved to be a serious blunder,
decided to hold the Dalai Lama responsible for this defeat and
declared him deposed. Initially annoyed with the British, the
Tibetans became infuriated with the Qing for what they regarded
as egregious interference in their internal affairs. Since the Godking holds his position not as an official with duties to perform, but
as the reincarnation of a certain Living Buddha, the only way he
can legitimately be deposed is by declaring him a false reincarnation. This would have to be done by the appropriate Tibetan
religious authorities, which the Qing officials clearly were not.
Hence, the court's decree was ignored. A further consequence of
the blunder was to convince the shrewd and highly competent
Dalai Lama that a degree of cooperation with Britain would
enhance his chances of survival. Trade with India grew, British
advisers were welcomed in Lhasa, and the Tibetan government
began to insist that when the representative of the Qing requested
an audience, the British consul be present as well. The 1911
revolution that toppled the Qing dynasty enabled the Tibetans to
rid themselves of the Chinese presence, on the grounds that their
association had been with a particular dynasty, and a non-Han
Chinese dynasty at that, rather than with the state itself. Tibetan
independence was never officially accepted by the Republican
government of China,2though it was too weak to exercise actual
administration over the territory. Just on the verge of formalizing
the status of the buffer state it had so long sought, Britain became
absorbed in World War I. The difficulties of the post-war period
and the increasing certainty that India would attain independence
combined to diminish Foreign Office interest in formally severing
Tibet from a China that did not control it anyway. A few individuals, some with official positions, retained their interest in the
country. Basically, however, the newly independent India became the legatee of the Tibetan cause.
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The second stage in the internationalization of the
Tibet question may be considered to have begun with the Chinese
Communist conquest of the country in October 1950. By actually
asserting control over Tibet and announcing its intention to
eventually make drastic changes in the area's political, social and
economic systems, the People's Republic of China (PRC) galvanized a number of international forces. Understandably, these
were most prominent in Tibet's nearest neighbor. Indian diplomats worried that China would use Tibet as a forward area from
which to press territorial claims; Indian business interests feared
interruption in trade routes, and Indian religious leaders were
concerned about the fate of their lamaist Buddhist colleagues.
World anti-communist forces, most vocally those in the United
States, lamented the loss of yet another area to the MarxistLeninist conspiracy. The defeated Nationalist (KMT) government of China, which had fled to Tai wan, was also concerned with
developments in Tibet. Although one of the few things the KMT
and the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) agree on is that Tibet is
part of China, the KMT understandably also wished to weaken its
communist adversary wherever it could.
The intelligence agencies of the US, India, and Taiwan all
appear to have been active in Tibet, providing arms, money, and
training to anti-communist Tibetan guerrillas. Since most were
from the Kham region, they were collectively known as the
Khambas. Typically, these fighters were hardy merchants whose
caravans had legitimate reasons for travelling throughout the
country. Familiar with the terrain, accustomed to strenuous activity at high altitudes, and with good contacts among the people,
they effectively turned Mao Zedong's military advice that "the
army is the fish and the people are the water; the water will support
the fish" against the communist troops. One source estimates that
by 1959, 42,000 Khamba guerrillas were being funded by the US
Central Intelligence Agency. He describes their major activity as
mining the roads between Tibet and China proper.
Meanwhile, the CCP government attempted to assert its
jurisdiction over the area. Both from its own point of view and by
comparison with the many changes it made in China proper during
this period, the CCP could not be accused of wielding a heavy
hand in the area it later designated the Tibet Autonomous Region
(TAR) from 1950 through 1958. It did, however, attempt reforms
in other areas inhabited by Tibetans which aroused significant
resistance. It also made a number of decisions that created tension
with Tibetans regardless of their place of residence.
Among the most noteworthy of these was to expand the
administrative jurisdiction of Qinghai province to include several
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so-called autonomous Tibetan prefectures. As these territories
were contiguous to the area that the CCP designated the Tibetan
Autonomous Region, and had been considered by Tibetans as the
country's Amdo province, the action was criticized as a "divide
and rule" tactic. So also was the creation of comparable Tibetan
autonomous areas in Sichuan province. Chinese anthropologists'
"discovery" of two additional minority ethnic groups, the Loba
and the Monba, within the Tibetan Autonomous Region (TAR)
was similarly construed as an effort at dividing and weakening.
The Chinese also proved adept at exploiting already existing
cleavages within Tibetan society, for example between the secular nobility and the monastic hierarchy, and between the wealthy
and the poor, to their own advantage. In this instance, of course,
the term "divide and rule" is somewhat misleading: the Chinese
did not create the divisions, but rather cleverly manipulated them
to serve Party policy.
A road-building program also proved highly unpopular:
most Tibetans did not regard highway construction as a beneficial
upgrade for the infrastructure, but instead saw the project as
creating smooth paths for an invasion of unwanted Chinese
immigrants, bureaucrats, and soldiers. Moreover, while Party
propaganda regularly railed out against the burdensome corvee
labor arrangement required by the traditional system, Tibetans
found themselves "volunteered" for road construction duties by
their Chinese mentors.
A number of other tensions were unintended. The Chinese
People's Liberation Army (PLA)'s need to obtain food supplies
locally created food shortages and inflationary pressures in a
society that had heretofore been insulated from both. PLA mess
units stationed at Lhasa regularly burned bones, as well as other
remnants of food, as part of their regular sanitation procedures,
not realizing that this offended Tibetan religious beliefs. For their
part, the Chinese were horrified at many Tibetan practices. Socalled sky burial, in which corpses were exposed to be picked
clean by vultures, contrasted sharply with Chinese notions of
reverence toward deceased ancestors. Frugal Chinese were also
horrified to discover that more than half of Tibet's butter production was burned as incense in the temples. Moreover, olfactory
senses that associated the scent of sandlewood and burning joss
sticks with religious ceremonies found the odor of burning rancid
butter difficult to get used to.
While some Tibetans proved successful collaborators,
and found their lives materially enriched because of it, a much
larger number regarded the Chinese as unwelcome imperialists
and resisted them in various ways ranging from passive resistance
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to armed attacks. Tensions accumulated. In 1958, Tibetan refugees from outside the TAR began to arrive in Lhasa with horror
stories of what the disastrous social experiment known as the
Great Leap Forward had done to the rest of the country. Millions
of people throughout China were dying of starvation and related
diseases. In Tibetan communities, forced communization had
been accompanied by mass arrests and the destruction of monasteries. Quite naturally, both the refugees and residents of the TAR
assumed that a comparable program of reforms would soon be
imposed there. Existing tensions were exacerbated. When, in
March 1959, a rumor spread that the Chinese were about to kidnap
the Dalai Lama, a major rebellion began.
The PLA put down the rebellion with relative ease, though
scattered resistance continued for a long time thereafter, and the
fact that the uprising occurred at all was a severe embarrassment
to the Chinese government. The PRC had been touting the
relevance of the Chinese path to socialism as a model for the nonHan Chinese societies of the developing world, whereas the
implied message of the revolt was that a large number of Tibetans
were extremely unhappy with it. Party propaganda had in fact
portrayed the Tibetan people as pathetically grateful for Chinese
beneficence in providing them with roads, schools, and modem
medicine.
The CCP declared that the revolt had been caused by a
small number of disgruntled aristocrats and religious figures who
had "hoodwinked" the masses into participating and abducted the
Dalai Lama. It also judged that the revolt had ended an agreement
made with the Tibetan government in 1951, and began an ambitious reform program. One important effect of the revolt was to
end the special treatment promised, albeit on a temporary basis
only, to Tibet, and to facilitate Tibet's integration into the regular
administrative system of China. This did not, of course, guarantee
that the area would become integrated into China in the more
important psychological sense.
Another important consequence of the 1959 revolt was
that it created a Tibetan diaspora. At least 80,000 refugees-out
of a total population estimated at about 4.5 million, and including
the Dalai Lama himself-made
their way out of the country,
bringing vivid accounts of the hardships of life under Chinese
colonialism that were highlighted by the world media. The Dalai
Lama and a majority of these refugees settled in India, with
sizeable groups also in Nepal and Bhutan. International refugee
organizations arranged for small groups to settle in several other
countries, including, among others, Switzerland, Canada, and the
United States. Others made their way to Taiwan. From these
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bases, the same people who had tried to keep the world at bay
proved immensely skillful at attracting world attention to their
cause. Hence, 1959 may be considered to mark the beginning of
the third phase of the internationalization of the Tibetan question.
The Tibetan Government-in-Exile set up representative
offices cultural and administrative capitals of the world, and
began to lobby for the cause of Tibet. Typically, these publish
newsletters summarizing developments in Tibet. 4 There are also
international monthlies, the Tibetan Review and Tibetan Bulletin,
which deal with various aspects of traditional religion and culture
and give news on the activities of the various diaspora communities as well as chronicling events in Tibetan areas under PRC
control. An international Tibet Press Watch compiles data on
news concerning Tibet from the world media. Since adherents of
many faiths can be assumed to have sympathy for those of other
faiths who are being oppressed, Tibetan Buddhists have set up
contacts with other religious communities. Such groups have
been instrumental in having the Dalai Lama or his representatives
invited to their countries to speak. The Chinese government is
strongly opposed to such visits.
Tibetan efforts received a setback in the 1970s when most
of the international community began to seek betterrelations with
the PRC. The US ceased its support of the Khamba guerrillas,
many of whom were summarily executed. It, and other countries
as well, began to give more consideration to China's attitude
toward Tibet. The PR C's protests and vague but strongly-worded
threats of retaliation have intimidated all but a handful of world
leaders from receiving the Dalai Lama. Most governments have,
however, been willing to agree to an unofficial visit from His
_Holiness in order to confer privately (though typically attended
by much publicity) with interested groups. These have included,
among others, universities with religious study programs, Buddhist associations who express the desire to discuss fine points of
theology, and Jewish groups who wish to conduct an inter-faith
dialogue. An ongoing subject of discussion with obvious mutual
interest between the Dalai Lama and world Jewish communities
concerns the matter of how an exile group maintains its cultural
and religious identity many centuries after leaving its homeland. 5
While Tibet's international status is not the topic of His Holiness's
speech, the issue is almost invariably raised in the question and
answer session, and is addressed. Jewish groups have been strongly
supportive of Tibet: for example, during the summer of 1990, the
Central Conference of American Rabbis passed a resolution
condemning the PRC for its treatment of Tibetans, urged President Bush to invite His Holiness to the White House, and asked
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Congress to pass a bill granting permanent visas to a thousand
Tibetans. 6
Exile leaders have also sought to attract attention to
Tibet' scause by enhancing the world's awareness of their country's
distinctive culture. New York's Tibet House, for example, sponsors art exhibitions and conferences. Tibetan paintings have
toured major museums of the world, and Tibet handicrafts shops
sell such items as traditional carpets, fabrics, and jewelry. Several
publication houses specialize in books dealing with Tibet, carrying titles on topics including traditional medicine, religion, and art
as well as politics . While Tibetan leaders would deny that there is
a public relations motive behind these ventures, they have indeed
served to draw attention to the area's plight. A number of prominent people have become activists in support of Tibet, including
American film actor Richard Gere and German Green Party leader
Petra Kelly.
These efforts to call attention to the cause of Tibet have
been helped by the PRC's lack of success in administering the
region. The reform policies imposed after the 1959 rebellion
included the wholesale destruction of most monasteries and the
arrival of a large number of Han Chinese administrators who
neither knew the country nor appeared interested in remedying
this deficiency. Most immigrant Chinese seemed to ignore the
CCP's orders to learn Tibetan. The Cultural Revolution, which
began in 1966, was a particularly devastating experience in Tibet.
While most of the actual fighting appears to have occurred
between different factions of Han Chinese Red Guards rather than
direct! yin vol vin~ Tibetans, there was great destruction to temples
and monasteries. By September 1966, the official Xinhua news
agency reported that the prayer flags that formerly flew from
Lhasa roofs had all been replaced by the five-star Chinese flag,
and that walls and household shrines now contained images of
Chairman Mao Zedong rather than "superstitious" pictures. 8
In the 1970s, a more benign policy toward China's ethnic
minorities in general allowed Tibetans as well as others more
freedoms. But an effort to force Tibetans to grow wheat rather than
the traditional barley backfired badly. Touted as a way of raising
crop yields, it was perceived by many Tibetans as forcing them to
raise an unwanted commodity in order to feed more Han immigrants. Wheat proved to be unsuitable ecologically as well as
culturally: after a few years of apparently good results, the soil
became exhausted. Crops failed disastrously in the late 1970s, to
the extent that in 1980 Han immigrants were evacuated because
of the food shortage. 9
The government reversed its wheat policy, allowing Ti-
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betans to raise barley again. It also ended the commune system,
resulting in increases in agriculture and livestock production.
Rural discontents were reduced, although urban dissatisfactions
continued to grow. A number of factors were involved, only a few
of which space permits to be mentioned here. 1 First, in order to
encourage Han to come to Tibet and contribute their skills to the
area's development, the government paid them salary supplements. This created a two-tier wage scale that disadvantaged local
people and created jealousy. Second, Tibetans complained that
Han received preferential treatment in hiring and promotions.
Tourism presented other, more complicated problems.
The Chinese government has encouraged tourism as a
relatively easy way to enhance its foreign exchange holdings, and
Tibet, though an expensive destination, has had considerable
appeal for foreign visitors. Some Tibetans welcomed the visitors,
and prospered by selling items such as ceremonial scarves and distinctively Tibetan jewelry made of coral, turquoise, and silver.
Others viewed tourism as one more example of Tibet's exploitation by the Chinese, feeling that it was the Han rather than the
locals that profited from it. In the words of one native,

°

First the Chinese cut our trees, mined our
gold, and took our grain. Now there's nothing left,
and they're selling our country to the foreigners. 11
Foreign tourists report being approached by Tibetans who
wished to complain about their treatment by the Chinese, and who
begged them not for money, but for pictures of the Dalai Lama. A
number of the tourists had come because of a prior interest in
Tibetan culture and religion, and were therefore predisposed
toward sympathy with the local people. Various forms of collusion developed, including the smuggling in ofreligious tracts, and
the smuggling out of letters to Western human rights groups.
Demonstrations of varying sizes were endemic; at least one
tourist, a Dutch human rights advocate, was shot by Chinese
police as she marched with the protestors.
In March 1989, on the thirtieth anniversary of the 1957
rebellion, a demonstration turned particularly brutal, with 450
Tibetans killed and thousands more arrested. The TAR was placed
under martial law for over a year. An eyewitness to the demonstration reported that he and approximately a hundred other tourists
had been expelled from Lhasa so that there could be no outside
corroboration for the retaliation that the PLA and police were
about to take. 12 During the following year, a defecting Han Xinhua
correspondant presented evidence that the demonstration had in
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fact been incited by a~ents provocateurs acting on instructions
from Beijing. 13
In sum, the record of Chinese administration in Tibet has
given the region's refugee lobbyists a long grievance list with
which to attract international attention.
Demands
Independence from Chinese rule has been the consistent
demand of Tibetan expatriate communities, as well as antiChinese activists within Tibet. 14 Some individuals have occasionally intimated that they might be willing to define independence
in a manner that did not imply complete and total separation from
Chinese rule. If the region were to truly be given the autonomy
implied in its designation as an autonomous region, many Tibetans would probably be mollified. Foreign sources have suggested
that Tibet be re-designated a Special Administrative Region
(SAR), a classification written into the PRC's 1982 constitution
in order to facilitate the re-integration of Hong Kong, Macao, and
Taiwan with the People's Republic. This plan was not well
received by Tibetans, and received an unequivocal rejection from
the Beijing government. The latter declared that the status of Tibet
had been fixed by treaty many years ago, and was not subject to
re-negotiation.
In June, 1988, during an address to the European Parliament at Strasbourg, the Dalai Lama outlined the framework for a
Hong Kong style settlement. The key points were:
- Beijing would be responsible for Tibet's foreign policy;
- Tibet would be governed by its own constitution or basic
law;
- the Tibetan government would comprise a popularly
elected chief executive, a bicameral legislature, and an
in dependent legal system;
- Ti bet would become a demilitarized zone, but with China
retaining the right to maintain military installations in
Tibet for defensive purposes only, until neutral
ity is established. 15
Most outside observers found the Strasbourg statement
constructive, noting that for the first time, the Dalai Lama had
formally asked for an arrangement short of total independence. 16
Most Tibetans, and most vocally the younger generation thereof,
did not approve of the statement, and pressed for immediate and
complete independence with no conditions attached. The Chinese
leadership accused the Dalai Lama of trying to internationalize
what was actually an entirely domestic matter. They credited the
proposal with "a change in tone," though rejecting it as tanta49

mount to a declaration of independence or semi-independence,
neither of which was acceptable.
The Dalai Lama was, however, invited to Beijing for
negotiations. 17 The Dalai Lama agreed to negotiate, but wished to
do so at a location outside of China. PRC leaders initially seemed
cool to the idea, but in September 1988 agreed to allow the Dalai
Lama to choose the site. 18 However, the Chinese side then refused
to accept as part of the Tibetan negotiating team a Dutch lawyer
who had worked with the exile government for many years. The
Dalai Lama's group countered by saying that the attorney, a
specialist in international law, was an adviser to, rather than a
member of, the negotiating team.
At this point, a Hong Kong newspaper reported that
younger Tibetan radicals, frustrated at the lack of progress on the
part of the Dalai Lama's government, and by the Indian
government's neutral stance, began to urge a global terror campaign. This would include bombing PRC embassies, assassinating high-ranking Chinese leaders, and hijacking the mainland's
planes. When reminded that the religion and its leader, in whose
names they acted, consistently preached non-violence, the radicals replied that they saw independence as a strictly political issue
which should not be compromised by religion. 19 While Tibetan
sources have criticized this news report as greatly exaggerated,
the existence of a substantial number of younger Tibetan radicals
is not denied. China responded to this news by intensifying its
efforts to find pronationalist leaders and put them in jail. 20
The atmosphere surrounding the consultations about
negotiations was further clouded in January 1989, by the death of
Tibet's second highest reincarnation, the Panchen Lama. He had
not left the country after the 1959 rebellion, and had had a good,
though not completely unblemished, record ofloyalty to whatever
the Party line happened to be at any given moment. It was
therefore shocking when, at a ceremonial occasion on January 24,
he stated that, although there had been development in Tibet since
its liberation by the CCP, this development had been outweighed
by what it had cost. 21 Xinhua subsequently announced that he had
died on January 28, of a heart attack. 22 Since the lama was only 51,
had no previous history of heart disease, and was survived by both
his parents as well as numerous siblings, suspicious minds concluded he had been murdered in retaliation for his outspokenness.23
It is impossible to substantiate these charges, and the truth
may never be known. What is certain is that the Panchen Lama's
death deepened the atmosphere of distrust between Tibet and
China, and deprived the Chinese government of an important
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conduit to the Dalai Lama. When Tibet was placed under martial
law after the apparently Beijing-contrived rebellion of March
1989, the possibility of successful negotiations became still more
remote. The Tiananmen incident in June provided yet another
obstacle. As of early 1991, no meaningful progress had been
made.
Resolution
The prospects forresolution of the Tibetan question do not
look bright. While the plight of the Tibetans has aroused world
sympathy, no major foreign government has been willing to
jeopardize its good relations with China in order to actively
support the Tibetan cause. Their attitude did not alter either after
the PRC government moved violently against Chinese demonstrators in Tiananmen Square in June of 1989, or after the Dalai
Lama was awarded the 1989 Nobel Peace Prize.
In August 1990, the Dalai Lama announced that the
continued existence of the institution of Dalai Lama would be up
to the Tibetan people, and that he was willing to give up his
demand for an independent Tibet and settle for autonomy within
China. He called talk of complete independence "a little unrealistic," though admitting this view would be unpopular with his
followers. 24 Indeed it has been. A factor further complicating the
difficulties of finding a negotiated settlement to the Tibet question
is the rise of a new generation of militants, both within the TAR
and in the various exile communities. While their reverence for
the Dalai Lama is sincere, they apparently find no inconsistency
between these professions of unswerving devotion and their
rejection of the Dalai Lama's message of non-violence. Even
were the Beijing government inclined to compromise-which
thusfar it has not been-the compromise might not be acceptable
to a sufficient number of Tibetans. Democratization has affected
the Tibetan exile community to a significant degree: as of May
1990, for example, the Tibetan cabinet is now selected through
popular election. Compliance with the Dalai Lama's wishes
cannot be taken for granted. Moreover, people accustomed to
speaking their minds freely and choosing their own officials will
find it difficult to re-integrate themselves into a Tibet ruled by the
current Chinese government.
The Dalai Lama has viewed developments in the Soviet
Union and Eastern Europe as a possible precursorofliberalization
in China, in which case a settlement might be possible. Chinese
dissidents who fled to the West after the Tiananmen incident have
in fact suggested that, under a democratic government, China
could become a federation of five parts, including the mainland,
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Taiwan, Hong Kong, Macao, and Tibet; each would have its own
seat in the UN. 25 The advent of a democratic China is, of course,
a rather large conditfon to the fruition of this plan. Moreover, even
a popularly elected Chinese government might not be willing to
let Tibet go its own way.
In the short term, at least, a more plausible scenario is the
emergence of a Northern Ireland-like situation, in which religious
festivals or the anniversaries of previous uprisings become the
occasions for outpourings of popular discontent. Each new uprising has the potential to provide more martyrs to the cause, and
avenging the honor of the martyrs will provide the reason for
future uprisings in Tibet. These will generate considerable sympathy from the international community, but no foreign government is apt to make any serious effort to influence China to loosen
its hold over the region.
What China gets out of its occupation of Tibet is not
immediately clear. There is undoubtedly a strong nationalistic
motive: the PRC has maintained the southwestern boundaries of
the Qing dynasty Chinese empire. Certainly the motivation for its
continued presence is not economic. While Tibet contains uranium and other valuable minerals, they are not easily accessible.
The TAR has since its inception been a substantial drain on the
central government treasury, and the situation is getting worse
rather than better. A 1985 article in one of the PRC' s leading
economic journals noted that money invested in Tibet did not have
a multiplier effect. An increase of one Ylliill in output value
required an input of 1.21 Yllil!linstate subsidies. Over the previous
thirty years, the average increase in output value in the TAR had
been 5.45%, while the average annual increase in state subsidies
was nearly 15%. Tibet was in fact becoming~
dependent on
state subsidies rather than less. 26
China does, of course, have a legitimate security interest
in protecting its southwestern borders, but with Sino-Soviet
relations and Sino-Indian relations so much improved, the continued stationing of troops estimated from a low of 50,000 troops to
a high of 250,000 in the TAR would seem unnecessarily expensive from a defensive point of view. A more convincing argument
for the PRC government's refusal to compromise on Tibet is that
it fears the demonstration effect: granting independence, or even
meaningful autonomy, to Tibet might well prompt similar, or
even more far-reaching, demands from China's other minority
groups. Some of their areas, such as the already restive Xinjiang
Uighur Autonomous Region, are potentially very wealthy, and
their resources are more easily tapped than those of Tibet. The
problems that contentious ethnic minorities, rich or poor, can pose
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for the central government have been amply demonstrated in the
Soviet Union in recent years.
It is not completely out of the question that a future Beijing
government may come to the conclusion that granting a degree of
internal self-government to Tibet would be preferable to continuing to sustain a financial black hole which is simultaneously an
acute human rights embarrassment. At that point, it will become
a question of whether the Dalai Lama can persuade his militant
supporters to agree to such a compromise.
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